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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
MAl v. PEAK: SHOULD LOADING 
OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE INTO 
RAM CONSTITUTE COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In MAl Systems Corp., v. Peak Computer Inc. (hereinafter 
"MAI"),I the Ninth Circuit held that the loading of computer 
operating system software into RAM2 creates a copy of this 
software in RAM and, in the absence of a valid license, consti-
tutes copyright infringement under § 101 of the Copyright Act.s 
Computer operating system software, essential to the opera-
tion of the computer,· is automatically loaded into RAM when 
the computer is turned on.1I This loading reproduces in RAM the 
information stored in the operating software, creating a repre-
sentation of the operating software in RAM.6 All representations 
1. MAl Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (per 
Brunetti, J., joined by Pregerson, J., and Fernandez, J.), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 671 
(1994). 
2. Random Access Memory ("RAM") is a computer component which temporarily 
stores information from programs loaded into the computer. When the computer is 
turned off, the information in RAM is erased. Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 594 F. 
Supp. 617, 622 (C.D.CA 1984). 
3. MAl, 991 F.2d at 517-19; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
4. Operating system programs manage the internal func~ions of the computer and 
translate application programs from a human-readable source code to a machine-reada-
ble object code. This makes possible the use of application programs, which perform 
specific tasks, such as word processing. Christian H. Nadan & James w. Morando, How 
Courts Encourage Standardization and Interoperability, 10 COMPUTER LAWYER 12, 13 
(1993). 
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in RAM are only temporary because they are lost when the.com-
puter is turned off.' However, the Ninth Circuit decided that the 
representation of the operating software was sufficiently perma-
nent to constitute a "copy" under § 101 of the Copyright Act.8 
Without considering the possible justifications for making a copy 
under the Copyright Act, the court held that the making of this 
copy resulted in copyright infringement.9 
The Ninth Circuit's holding means that any time a third 
party, such as a computer maintenance technician, turns on a 
computer, shelO is infringing the operating system software's 
copyright unless she has previously purchased a license to use 
that software. l1 In addition to producing counterintuitive re-
sults, this holding appears to contradict several Ninth Circuit 
cases decided last year .12 
7. See supra note 2. 
8. MAl 991 F.2d at 518. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a copy as a tangi-
ble medium of expression that is sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980). This comment is partially premised on the argument that a tem-
porary representation in RAM should not be considered a copy under the Copyright Act; 
see infra notes 113-118 for a brief discussion of the matter. 
9. MAl, 991 F.2d at 511. The Ninth Circuit dismissed as inapplicable 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117 (1980) (allowing an owner of a copy of software to make a copy as an essential step 
in the utilization of that software or for archival purposes only) in a footnote and never 
mentioned 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (The Doctrine of Fair Use, allowing the making of a 
copy in a reasonable manner and for equitable reasons). See infra notes 70, 119 and 
accompanying text for the pertinent provisions of these sections. 
10. "She" and "he" will be used interchangeably throughout this article. 
11. See Stephen J. Davidson, Selected Legal and Practical Considerations Con-
cerning 'Scope of Use' Provisions, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, October 1993 (stating that 
the MAl holding means that the turning on of a computer for a purpose not authorized 
by the operating system license constitutes copyright infringement); Richard Raysman & 
Peter Brown, Independent Service Organizations, NEW YORK L.J., September 14, 1993 
(interpreting MAl as holding that copying of software in RAM constitutes a copy under 
§ 101 of the Copyright Act). See also David Nadvorney, Loading Software Into RAM 
Violated Copyright, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 3, 1993; Copyrights: Computer 
Programs, THE UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, April 27, 1993; Ronald S. Katz & Betsy E. 
Bayha, Turned On, Turned Off, THE RECORDER, April 29, 1993; Susan Orenstein, 9th 
Circuit: You Can Fix, But You Better Not Touch, THE RECORDER, April 12, 1993; Ron-
ald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold, An Unprecedented Opinion With Sparse Analysis, THE 
COMPUTER LAWYER, May 1993. 
12. The holding in MAl increases the amount of copyright protection afforded to 
computer software, while recent holdings in other cases decided by the Ninth Circuit 
decrease such protection. See, e.g., Computer Assoc's Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
(BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992) (establishing a new substantial similarity test which decreases 
software copyright protection); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1992) (excusing reverse engineering under the Doctrine of Fair Use if disassembly is the 
only means of accessing noncopyrightable elements of a computer program); Lewis 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
MAl Systems Corporation ("MAl") is a former computer 
hardware and software manufacturer that continues to service 
its computers and operating system software. IS 
Peak Computer, Inc. ("Peak") is a computer maintenance 
company which also services MAl computers for over one hun-
dred clients in southern California.14 Clients who use MAl com-
puters account for between fifty and seventy percent of Peak's 
computer maintenance business. III When clients with MAl com-
puters asked for Peak's services, Peak technicians often had to 
turn the MAl computers on to determine the cause of the mal-
function. I6 When Peak technicians turned these computers on, 
MAl operating system software was automatically loaded into 
RAM.I7 When so loaded, the operating system software pro-
duced an error log which could be read on the computer monitor 
screen and which Peak technicians used as an aid in diagnosing 
the· problem. IS 
Peak's base of MAl customers surged when, in August of 
1991, it enticed MAl's customer service manager, Eric Francis, 
to leave MAl and join Peak. I9 Three other MAl employees fol-
lowed Francis.20 In addition, Francis successfully solicited other 
MAl clients to switch to Peak for computer maintenance.21 
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (holding that a derivative work 
does not constitute a copyright infringement). 
13. MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1993). MAl's 
operating system software is compatible only with MAl computers. MAl computers can-
not operate without this software. ld. 
14. ld. The worldwide market for service and maintenance of MAl computers pro-
duces revenues in excess of 50 million dollars per year. Approximately 90 percent of this 
market is controlled by MAl. Independent computer maintenance companies share the 
remaining 10 percent of the market. Advanced Computer Servo V. MAl Sys. Corp., 1993 
WL 522850 1 (E.D.Va. 1993). 
15. MAl, 991 F.2d at 513. 
16. Computer malfunctions are often related to the failure of circuit boards inside 
the computers. ld. Maintenance technicians can more easily determine the cause of the 
malfunction if they view the error log which is produced on the monitor screen when the 
operating system software is loaded into RAM. See Katz & Bayha, supra note 11. 
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On March 17, 1992, MAl filed suit in the United States dis-
trict court, for copyright infringement, seeking a temporary re-
straining order (hereinafter "TRO") and a preliminary injunc-
tion to enjoin Peak, Peak's president, and Francis from servicing 
any MAl computer systems.22 The district court granted the 
TRO and subsequently issued a preliminary injunction against 
Peak.23 The Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction in 
part.24 
After the Ninth Circuit denied Peak's motion to stay the 
district court's proceedings, the district court heard a motion for 
summary judgment on some of the same issues raised in the mo-
tion for the preliminary injunction.211 The district court granted 
partial summary judgment for MAl and granted a permanent 
injunction, which was stayed in part by the Ninth Circuit.26 
22. Id. at 519. The complaint also alleged misappropriation of trade secrets, trade-
mark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition. Id. This comment will 
evaluate only the copyright infringement claim. 
23. Id. The written version of the preliminary injunction was issued on April 15, 
1992. Id. Section A(l) of the preliminary injunction prohibited Peak from "infringing 
MAl's copyrights in any manner and from using, publishing, copying, selling, distribut-
ing or otherwise disposing of any copies or portions of copies of the following MAl copy-
righted computer program packages: 'MPx,' '8 x,' 'GPx40,' and 'GPx70' (collectively 
hereinafter, 'the Software')." Id. at 513-14. 
Section A(3) of the preliminary injunction prohibited Peak from maintaining any 
MAl computer systems. In section A(3)(a) the injunction defined maintenance as "ser-
vice, repair, or upkeep in any manner whatsoever that involves ... the use of MAl's 
operating system, diagnostic, utility, or other software." "Use" was defined in section 
A(3)(b) as "the acts of running, loading, or causing to be run or loaded, any MAl 
software from any magnetic storage or read-only-memory device into the computer mem-
ory of the central processing unit of the computer system." Finally, "computer system" 
was defined in section A(3)(c) as a "MAl central processing unit in combination with 
either a video display, printer, disk drives, and/or keyboard." Id. at 514. 
24. MAl, 991 F.2d at 514. On June 9, 1992, the Ninth Circuit stayed section A(l) of 
the preliminary injunction to the extent that it prohibited Peak from operating MAl 
computers in order to maintain them. Section A(3), enjoining Peak from maintaining any 
MAl computer system, was stayed in its entirety, including subsections (a), (b), and (c). 
Id. 
25. Id. at 515. 
26. Id. Section A(l) of the district court's permanent injunction, issued on February 
2, 1993, enjoined Peak from "[C)opying ... MAl's copyrighted works, or any derivatives 
thereof . . . . The 'copying' enjoined herein specifically includes the acts of loading, or 
causing to be loaded, directly or indirectly, any MAl memory device in to the electronic 
random access memory of the actual processing unit of a computer system." Id. Section 
A(2) of the permanent injunction enjoined Peak from the misappropriation of trade 
secrets. Id. On February 4, 1993, the Ninth Circuit stayed Sections A(l) and A(2) to the 
extent that they prohibited Peak from loading MAl software or operating MAl's com-
puters in order to maintain them. MAl, 991 F.2d at 515-16. 
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Peak appealed both the permanent injunction and parts of the 
preliminary injunction.27 Only the appeal of the permanent in-
junction was considered with respect to copyright infringement 
issues.28 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. PURPOSE AND DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
The authority for the development of American copyright 
law lies within the Constitution of the United States, which pro-
vides that Congress shall have the power to "promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts, by securing for a limited time to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries. "29 
The Copyright Clause was included in the United States 
Constitution to encourage the widest possible production and 
dissemination of literary, musical, and artistic works.30 The 
United States Supreme Court has stated: "The immediate effect 
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's 
creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good."31 Thus, 
27. [d. at 516. 
28. [d. Since the issue of copyright infringement was identical in the motions for 
both preliminary and permanent injunc'tions, there was no need to consider an appeal of 
both injunctions. [d. 
29. U.S, CONST. art. I, § 8. This section of Article I is also known as the "Copyright 
Clause." 
30. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 1.1, at 4 (1989). 
During the Constitutional Convention debates on the Copyright Clause, James Madison 
wrote that the right to useful inventions reasonably belongs to the inventors, and that 
the public good fully coincides with such rights. THE FEDERALIST, No. 43, at 267 (James 
Madison) (H.C. Lodge ed., 1888). 
31. Twentieth Cent. Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). See also Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("[The purpose of the Copy-
right Act 'is to) motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of 
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the 
limited period of exclusive control has expired."). According to MELVILLE B, NIMMER, 
COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF LAW § 1.03, at 1-44.13, 1-44.14 (2d ed. 1993), these 
statements mean that "the primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but 
is rather to secure the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of the au-
thors." But cf.: 
Despite what is said in some of the authorities that the au-
thor's interest in securing an economic reward for his labors is 
a secondary consideration, it is clear that the real purpose of 
5
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the copyright law balances two competing interests: motivating 
creative work by providing a temporary monopoly to its authors, 
yet promoting broad public availability of the creative work.32 
Under authority of the Copyright Clause, Congress enacted 
the first Federal Copyright Act in 1790.33 In 1964, with the ad-
vance of modern technology, the Copyright Office recognized 
that the authors of computer programs were entitled to protec-
tion under copyright law and began to accept computer pro-
grams for registration under the category of books. 34 Ten years 
later, Congress established the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (hereinafter 
"CaNTU") to research and recommend legislation for copyright 
protection of computers and computer programs. 311 In 1976, 
while still awaiting CaNTU's final recommendations, Congress 
enacted the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, which provided that 
computer programs and data bases, "to the extent that they in-
corporate authorship in the programmer's expression of the orig-
inal ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves," are 
copyrightable as literary works under § 102(a)(1) of the Act.3s 
the copyright scheme is to encourage works of the intellect, 
and that this purpose is to be achieved by reliance on the eco-
nomic incentives granted to authors and inventors by the 
copyright scheme. This scheme relies on the author to pro-
mote the progress of science by permitting him to control the 
cost of and access to his novelty. It is based on the premise 
that the exclusive right granted by the copyright laws will not 
impose unacceptable costs to society in terms of limiting ac-
cess to published works or pricing them too high. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), reu'd on 
other grounds, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
32. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 30, at 6. 
33. NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW, § 1.1, at 5 (1980). The Act was later amended 
in 1831 and in 1870. To accommodate changing technology the Act was amended again 
in 1909 to include motion pictures and sound recordings. Throughout all of these amend-
ments the Act provided for a dual system of copyright protection, applying state com-
mon law copyright for unpublished works and federal statutory copyright for published 
works. [d. 
34. BOORSTYN, supra note 33, § 2.21 at 65; see also THORNE D. HARRIS III. THE LE-
GAL GUIDE TO COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION 45 (1985). 
35. See BOORSTYN, supra note 33, § 2.21 at 65. 
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CCAN 5659, 5667. The Copyright Act of 1976 also replaced the dual 
system of copyright protection with a unified system of federal statutory copyright. 
Under the Unified national system of federal statutory copyright, all protectable works 
are protected from the time of their creation. BOORSTYN, supra note 33, § 1.7. A work is 
created when it is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later de-
6
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Congress also enacted an interim § 117, which maintained the 
status quo of programmers' rights until CONTU published its 
final recommendations.37 
In 1978, CONTU issued its Final Report, in which it recog-
nized that "the cost of developing computer programs is far 
greater than the cost of their duplication, . . . [making] some 
form of protection necessary to encourage the creation and 
broad distribution of computer programs in a competitive mar-
ket."38 However, after acknowledging the interest of proprietors 
in obtaining reasonable protection, CONTU recommended the 
repeal of § 117 (the interim provision).39 In its place, CONTU 
suggested that Congress enact a new § 117 which would limit 
the copyright owner's exclusive rights by permitting rightful 
possessors of a copy of a program to make or authorize the mak-
ing of another copy if required as an essential step in utilizing 
the program or for archival purposes only.40 In 1980, Congress 
veloped, from which it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101. A work is fixed "when 
its embodiment is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." BOOR-
STYN, supra note 33, at § 2.21. 
37. Interim § 117 provided that: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of [sections] 106 through 116 
and 118, this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in 
a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of 
the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of 
storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information, or 
in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, 
than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or 
the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 
31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an 
action brought under this title. 
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1977), repealed 1980. 
38. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, (hereinafter "CONTU Rep.") at 26-27, July 31, 1978. 
39. Id. at 30-31. The Report reasoned that to prevent any question of impropriety or 
program piracy and to assure that all works of authorship are treated comparably under 
the new law, § 117 should be repealed. See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Soft. Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255, 259-61 (5th Cir. 1988), for a discussion of the legislative history of the present 
§ 117. 
CONTU also recommended that § 101 of the Act be amended to include the defini-
tion of a "computer program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly 
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." CONTU Rep., supra 
note 38, at 30. 
40. CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 29-30. CONTU's proposed § 117(1) allowed 
rightful possessors of a copy of software to make copies of that software as an essential 
step in utilizing it. CONTU reasoned that because the act of loading a program into a 
7
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enacted the Computer Software Act which adopted CONTU's 
recommendations.41 In enacting the new § 117, Congress made 
only one change, granting the limited right to copy and adopt 
software to "owners" of a copy of software, as opposed to "right-
ful possessors" as suggested by CONTU.42 However, Congress 
stated no reasons for this change.4s Because Congress never 
stated its reasons for the change, there is now some question as 
to whether licensees of software, as opposed to owners of 
software copies, are accorded the protection of § 117(1).44 
B. ApPLICATION OF BASIC COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES TO COMPUTERS 
AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
Although by 1980 Congress had revised the Copyright Act 
to incorporate specific legislation for computer software protec-
tion, courts had little precedent to guide them in the application 
of basic copyright law principles to computer software. 
1. Basic Copyright Principles 
A fundamental principle of copyright law is that only the 
expression of the idea in a creative work is protected, not the 
computer's memory creates a copy of the program, "[o)ne who rightfully possesses a copy 
of a program ... should be provided with a legal right to copy it to that extent which 
will permit its use by the possessor." [d. at 31. Thus, CONTU's § 117(1) provided that 
"persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be able to use them freely without 
fear of exposure to copyright liability." [d. In its proposed § 117(2), the "archival excep-
tion," CONTU reasoned that a person in rightful possession of a copy of a program 
should have the right "to prepare archival copies of it to guard against destruction or 
damage by mechanical or electrical failure." [d. However, CONTU cautioned that the 
rightful possessor "should not, for example, make archival copies of a program and later 
sell some to another while retaining some for use." [d. 
41. "[T)he Act embodies the recommendations of [CONTU) with respect to clarify-
ing the law of copyright of computer software." HR REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 
pt. 1, at 23. 
42. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980). 
43. The Act's legislative history, stated in a short paragraph in a committee report, 
merely provides that the Act, "embodies the recommendations of [CONTU) with respect 
to clarifying the law of copyright of computer software." HR REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980). . 
44. See S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding 
the owner-licensee distinction); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th 
Cir. 1988) and Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D.Kan. 1989) 
(obliterating the owner-licensee distinction). See also John M. Conley & Vance F. 
Brown, Revisiting § 117 of the Copyright Act: An Economic Approach, THE COMPUTER 
LAWYER, November 1990. 
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idea itself.411 Applying this principle to computers, the un-
copyrightable portion of a computer program, the idea, consists 
of the methodologies and processes adopted by the 
programmer.46 
"Copyright" means the right to copy.47 Thus, once an ex-
pression is copyrighted, the right to copy it is reserved to the 
copyright owner.48 The copyright owner can extend this right to 
others by means of a license which usually allows a third party 
to copy the protected expression under certain limited condi-
tions.49 If a third party copies protectable expression under con-
ditions beyond the scope of his license or without a license, he 
infringes the copyright and is liable for monetary damages.5O 
The Copyright Act, however, contains two sections which 
justify unauthorized copying of protectable expression under 
certain conditions. The recently enacted § 117 allows the owner 
of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the mak-
ing of another copy of that computer program if such copying is 
an essential step in the utilization of the computer program or is 
used for archival purposes only.lIl Furthermore, § 107, com-
monly called the Doctrine of Fair Use, justifies using protectable 
expression without the consent of the copyright owner if the use 
is fair - made in a reasonable manner and for equitable rea-
sons.1I2 In determining whether unauthorized copying of protect-
able expression is fair use, four factors are considered: (1) the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
45. This basic principle was first recognized in the landmark case of Baker v. Sel· 
den, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which held that those aspects of a work which must necessarily 
be used in connection with the idea, system, or process described by the work are not 
copyrightable. Today this principle is incorporated in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976). 
46. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.18[J) at 2-221. 
47. BOORSTYN, supra note 33, § 1.1. 
48.Id. 
49. Davidson, supra note 11. 
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
51. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980). 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). The Doctrine of Fair Use is historically called the "equi-
table rule of reason" because it allows use of a copyrighted product or element in a 
reasonable manner, for equitable reasons, and without the consent of the copyright 
owner. Deborah A. Hartnett, The New Era for Copyright Law: Reconstituting the Fair 
Use Doctrine, ASCAP, 39 Copyright Law Symposium, at 177 (1992). 
, 
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tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work; 
and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market for, or the 
value of, the copyrighted work.1i3 
Since the method of producing and operating computer 
software is much different from that of conventional copyright 
subject matter such as literary works, the extension of copyright 
protection to computer programs forces the courts to face novel 
problems in interpreting the applicability of these fundamental 
copyright law principles to computer software. 
2. Special Problems Posed by Applicability of Copyright Law 
to Computer Software 
With the advent ~f computer software, especially operating 
system programs, came the issue of whether it was possible to 
protect a program's expression without protecting its idea. 
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Corp.,1i4 the Third Cir-
cuit considered whether operating system programs were copy-
rightable. The defendant in that case conceded the copyright-
ability of application programs but argued that operating system 
programs represented a "process," "system," or "method of op-
eration," which is uncopyrightable under § l02(b) of the Copy-
right Act.1i1i The Apple court held that operating system pro-
grams are no different, for copyright purposes, from application 
programs,1i6 and are copyrightable unless they "represent the 
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
54. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
55. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1249. "Process," "system," or "method of operation" are un-
copyrightable because they are the ideas of the program. See supra note 45. 
56. Application programs are programs which perform specific tasks, such as word 
processing, tax preparation, or accounting. In contrast, the role of the operating system 
programs is to translate application programs from the human-readable code in which 
they were written into the machine-readable code in which they are performed by the 
computer. Nadan & Morando, supra note 4. The court held that both operating system 
programs and application programs: 
instruct the computer to do something. Therefore, it should 
make no difference for purposes of § 102{b) whether these in-
structions tell the computer to help prepare an income tax re-
turn (the task of an application program) or to translate a 
high level language program from source code into its binary 
language object code form (the task of an operating system 
program). 
Apple, 714 F.2d at 1251. 
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only means of expression of the idea underlying them," consti-
tuting a merger of idea and expression.1I7 
Four years later, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Den-
tal Laboratory, Inc.,lIs the Third Circuit inquired into the scope 
of copyrightability of application programs. The Whelan court 
held that: 
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work 
w<;>uld be the work's idea, and everything that is 
not necessary to that purpose or function would 
be part of the expression of the idea, . . . Where 
there are various means of achieving the desired 
purpose, then the particular means chosen is not 
necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expres-
sion, not idea.09 
Thus, according to Whelan, copyright protection of com-
puter programs extends not only to their literal code but to their 
structure, sequence, and organization.60 
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ApPLICABILITY OF COPYRIGHT 
LA W TO COMPUTERS AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
With the recent influx of breakthroughs in advanced tech-
nology, the broad protection offered by the Whelan rule has met 
with a less than favorable reception.61 One reason for this reac-
57. [d. at 1253. A similar decision was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Apple Com-
puter v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). 
A work representing a merger of idea and expression is rendered uncopyrightable 
due to the impossibility of separating its uncopyrightable idea from its copyrightable 
expression. 
58. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
59. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236. 
60. [d. at 1248. 
61. NIMMER, supra note 31, states that the Whelan rule is incorrect because it as-
sumes that only one idea, as this term is defined by the Copyright Law, underlies a 
computer program, so that once this idea is identified, everything else is protectable ex-
pression. However, Nimmer states, each subroutine has at least one idea. 
The court in the landmark case of Computer Assoc's Int'l v. Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
(BNA) 1241 (2nd Cir. 1992), agreed with Nimmer's evaluation of Whelan. The lower 
court stated that Whelan's synonymous use of the terms "structure, sequence, and or-
ganization" demonstrated that the court was mistaken in its interpretation of a com-
puter program's method of operation. Altai, 775 F. Supp, at 559-60. 
The district court in Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (1992), 
cited Altai in support of its criticism of Whelan, stating that although the purpose of the 
11
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tion is that the staggering variety of computer software on the 
market has caused courts to call for interoperability between 
computers and computer programs, necessitating the reduction 
of protection under the Copyright Act.62 A few landmark cases 
decided last year are illustrative of this trend. 
In Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.,63 the 
Second Circuit rejected the Whelan rule and established a new, 
three-step test of abstraction, filtration, and comparison for de-
termining whether non-literal structures of computer programs 
are substantially similar.6 • The Second Circuit explained the sig-
Copyright Act is to prevent individuals from copying creative expression without putting 
the effort into its creation, overly broad copyright protection may inhibit the adoption of 
compatible standards, as well as inhibiting the incentive to create new expression. 
[d. 
62. Nadan & Morando, supra note 4. 
Consider, for example, the standard typewriter (called the 
"QWERTY" typewriter for the first six keys along the top row 
of letters). Since all typewriters use this QWERTY key ar· 
rangement, one only need learn to type once, and then can 
type no matter whose typewriter is available. If typewriter 
companies were forbidden from copying the QWERTY for· 
mat, one would need to learn to type several different ways, or 
could not use different typewriters in different places. This ex-
ample illustrates the efficiency gained by standard typewriter 
interfaces. 
Also, decreased copyright protection allows computer engineers access to a greater 
variety of programs which they can modify to create a new product, benefitting the pub-
lic. See Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Lewis Galoob 
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
63. 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992). Computer Associates developed a job 
scheduling program which contained an interface component called ADAPTER. Claude 
F. Arney III, the employee who developed this program, later left Computer Associates 
and joined Altai, taking the source code of ADAPTOR with him in breach of his em-
ployee agreement. At Altai, Arney developed a job scheduling program with an interface 
component called OSCAR 3.4. Unknown to Altai, Arney copied about thirty percent of 
OSCAR's source code from the ADAPTER source code. After Computer Associates filed 
suit as a result of this infringement, Altai used a "clean room" technique to develop a 
new version of OSCAR, called OSCAR 3.5. This version did not contain any ADAPTER 
source codes and was developed by programmers who were neither involved in the devel-
opment of OSCAR 3.4 nor were allowed access to it while developing OSCAR 3.5. None-
theless, Computer Associates insisted that OSCAR 3.5 was substantially similar in its 
structure, sequence, and organization to ADAPTER. [d. at 1243. 
64. Abstraction is a process where the allegedly copied program's structure is ana-
lyzed, isolating each level of abstraction within the program. The lowest level is "a set of 
individual instructions organized into a hierarchy of modules," while the highest level is 
"the ultimate function of the program." Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1253. 
Filtration is a process where the structural components of a program are examined 
at each level of abstraction in order to: 
12
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nificantly reduced protection offered by its test in comparison 
with the Whelan rule by stating that the main goal of copyright 
law is to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public 
good,"65 rather than to reward the labor of authors.66 The court 
further noted that the decreased protection offered by its test of 
abstraction, filtration, and comparison may do more to stimulate 
artistic creativity than the extremely protective Whelan rule, 
which "enables first comers to 'lock up' basic programming 
techniq ues. "67 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Ac-
colade, Inc.,66 approved of the Altai holding while further reduc-
ing the protection offered by the Whelan rule. The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that, although intermediate copying of a program 
Id. 
determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was 
'idea' or was dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to 
be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors ex-
ternal to the program itself; or taken from the public domain 
and hence ... non-protectable expression. 
After determining the abstraction levels and filtering the non-protectable elements 
at each of those levels, the test calls for a comparison of the remaining "core of protect-
able expression" to determine if any part of this core was copied into the allegedly in-
fringing program. Id. at 1256. 
After applying the three-part test of abstraction, filtration, and comparison, the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that OSCAR 3.5 did not infringe Com-
puter Associate's copyright in the ADAPTER. Id. at 1262. 
65. Id. at 1256-57. 
66. Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 
340 (1991)). 
67. Altai, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1241 at 1257. 
68. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). Sega is a manufacturer of both video games and 
the Genesis console. Only Sega-manufactured video games are compatible with the Gen-
esis console because only Sega-manufactured video games comprise an object code which 
contains the "key" that unlocks the "door" to the Genesis console. The object codes of 
games not manufactured by Sega do not contain this "key" and thus can't operate with 
the Genesis console. Accolade, a video game manufacturer, wanted to make its games 
compatible with the Genesis console but the only way it could obtain the "key" to this 
console was through reverse engineering. Id. at 1514-15. 
Reverse engineering is the translation of a machine-readable object code into a 
human-readable source code. A source code is a computer program written in any of 
several programming languages employed by computer programmers. An object code is 
the version of a program in which the source code language is converted or translated 
into the machine language of the computer with which it is to be used. CONTU Rep., 
supra note 38, at 21. Thus, if the "key" to the Genesis console was buried within the 
object code of Sega-manufactured video games, the only way Accolade could obtain this 
key was to translate the object code back into the source code; in other words, to reverse 
engineer. The engineering process requires making intermediate copies of the object 
code. 
13
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object code in the process of reverse engineering "falls squarely 
within the acts that are prohibited by the [Copyright Act],69 this 
copying may be excused under the Doctrine of Fair Use."70 After 
reasoning that both equitable factors and policy considerations 
weighed in favor of Accolade,71 the court found that: 
69. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518. 
In order to constitute a "copy" for the purposes of the Act, the 
allegedly infringing work must be fixed in some tangible form, 
"from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or a device." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The computer file gener-
ated by the disassembled program, the printouts of the 
. disassembled code, and the computer files containing Acco-
lade's modifications of the code that were generated during 
the reverse engineering process all satisfy that requirement. 
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522. 
70. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) provides: 
[Tlhe fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work . . . is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes, 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work, and 
(4) the effect of the use on the potential market for, or the 
value of, the copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
The Ninth Circuit noted that these statutory factors are not exclusive, and the fair 
use doctrine is essentially an "equitable rule of reason." Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522. 
71. As to the first factor of the Fair Use analysis, the purpose and character of the 
use, the court stated that Accolade's purpose for copying Sega's code, to determine the 
functional requirements needed to achieve compatibility with the Genesis console, was 
legitimate. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522-23. 
As to the second factor of the Fair Use analysis, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
the Ninth Circuit approved Altai's approach to the idea/expression distinction and ap-
proved of Altai's criticism of Whelan. The court then held that reverse engineering of 
the object code was the only way to gain access to the many functional, and thus non-
protectable, aspects of Sega's program. Since reverse engineering requires copying the 
object code, the court reasoned that such copying constituted fair use. [d. at 1524-26. 
The court weighed the third factor of the Fair Use analysis, the substantiality of the 
portion used, in favor of Sega, since Accolade copied Sega's programs in their entirety. 
[d. at 1524-27. 
As to the fourth factor of the Fair Use analysis, the effect of the use on the potential 
market, the court found in favor of Accolade, reasoning that since video game customers 
usually purchase more than one video game, there is no reason to assume that Accolade's 
production of video games for the Genesis console would affect the market for Sega's 
games. [d. at 1523-24. 
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[W]here disassembly72 is the only way to gain ac-
cess to the ideas and functional elements embod-
ied in a copyrighted computer program and where 
there is a legitimate reason for seeking such ac-
cess, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted 
work, as a matter of law.73 
663 
The Ninth Circuit justified reducing the amount of copy-
right protection afforded to computer software by stating that 
Accolade's achievement of compatibility with the Genesis con-
sole is consistent with the Copyright Act's purpose of promoting 
creative expression.74 The court explained that such an achieve-
ment "has led to an increase in the number of independently 
designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis 
console. "711 
The Ninth Circuit found that similar policy considerations 
supported the conclusion that a derivative work7s does not con-
stitute copyright infringement.77 In Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. u. 
Nintendo of America, Inc.,78 the court found that Galoob's de-
rivative work served the Copyright Act's purpose of promoting 
creative expression. The court explained that although the de-
rivative work had benefitted from Nintendo's popularity, 
Nintendo's sales benefitted from the extra power and conve-
nience afforded by the derivative work.79 
72. "Disassembly" implies reverse engineering. 
73. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527. 
74. Id. at 1523; see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit agreed with the Sega court that "reverse engineering 
object code to discern the unprotectable ideas in a computer program is fair use." Id. at 
843. However, the Federal Circuit was careful to define the scope of fair use as applied to 
reverse engineering, pointing out that the fair use exception applies only to individuals 
"in rightful possession of a copy of a work" if these individuals aim at nothing more than 
merely distinguishing a program's protectable elements from its unprotectable ones. Id. 
at 842, 844. 
75. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523. 
76. A device that operates only in conjunction with another software is called a de-
rivative work. Nadan & Morando, supra note 55 at 13. 
77. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Lewis Galoob Toys involved a device manufactured by Galoob called GAME GENIE, 
which attached to the Nintendo video game cartridge and acted as an enhancer for 
Nintendo games. "Game Genie" is compatible only with the Nintendo video game car-
tridge and does not operate without it. Id. 
78.Id. 
79. Id. at 965. 
15
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D. UNCHARTED WATERS 
Recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit and other circuit 
courts resulted in a revised substantial similarity test80 as well as 
reduced copyright protection allowing for reverse engineering81 
and derivative works.82 In MAl Systems Corporation v. Peak 
Computer Inc.,83 the Ninth Circuit addressed two issues not pre-
viously considered by the courts: (1) whether the loading of 
software into RAM constitutes a copy under § 106, and (2) 
whether the making of this copy constitutes copyright 
infringement. 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Peak appealed the permanent injunction, parts of the pre-
liminary injunction, and the partial summary judgment issued 
by the district court.84 With respect to the copyright infringe-
ment claim, however, Peak was only permitted to appeal the 
permanent injunction and the partial summary judgement.811 
The Ninth Circuit asserted its jurisdiction to review the entire 
permanent injunction issued by the district court,86 because the 
district court's grant of the permanent injunction was "inextri-
cably bound up" with its underlying decisions on the merits of 
the copyright claim.87 
80. See Computer Assoc's Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1241 (2nd Cir. 
1992). 
81. See Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, (9th Cir. 1992). 
82. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
83. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1992). 
84. MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir. 1992). 
85. ld. Since the same copyright infringement issues were involved in both prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctions, the Ninth Circuit granted MAl's motion to dismiss 
Peak's appeal of. the preliminary injunction with respect to copyright infringement is-
sues. The same ruling was given with respect to the trade secret misappropriation issue. 
ld. 
86.ld. 
87. MAl, 991 F.2d at 516. The court asserted jurisdiction over interlocutory orders 
granting injunctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(l) and cited Bernard v. Air Line Pilots 
Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 873 F.2d 213, 215 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1) brings before the court the entire order, and, in the interests of judicial 
economy the court may decide the merits of the case. The court, however, generally will 
chose to decide only those matters 'inextricably bound up with' the injunctive relief."). 
16
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The Ninth Circuit reviewed the partial summary judgment 
de novo.88 The purpose of the review, conducted in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, was to determine 
whether there were any genuine issues of material fact and 
whether the district court correctly applied relevant substantive 
law.89 
B. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, plaintiff 
must prove ownership of a copyright and the copying of protect-
able expression beyond the scope of a license.9o Since MAl's 
copyright ownership was undisputed, the main question in this 
case was whether the loading of operating system software con-
stituted copying of protectable expression beyond the scope of 
Peak's license. 
1. Loading of Operating System Software into RAM Consti-
tutes the Making of a Copy under the Copyright Act 
The Ninth Circuit noted that whether the loading of 
software from the computer's hard drive into RAM creates a 
"copy" under the Copyright Act is an issue of first impression 
for the court.91 
The court restated the definition of a "copy" pursuant to 
the Copyright Act:92 
[M]aterial objects, ... in which a work is fixed 
. . . and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device . 
. . . A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of ex-
pression when its embodiment in a copy ... is 
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
88. MAl, 991 F.2d at 516. See generally FDIC v. O'Melveny & Meyers, 969 F.2d 
744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 543 (1993). 
89. MAl, 991 F.2d at 516. 
90. [d. 
91. [d. at 519 ("We have found no case which specifically holds that the copying of 
software into RAM creates a "copy" under the Copyright Act."). 
92. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980). 
17
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perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than transitory 
duration. 93 
The Ninth Circuit noted that when a computer is turned on, 
the operating system software is automatically loaded into the 
computer's random access memory (RAM).94 The representation 
of the operating system software in RAM produces a system er-
ror log which can be viewed from the computer monitor screen.911 
When Peak technicians turned the MAl computers on to deter-
mine functionality, they were able to view the system error log 
and use it in performing maintenance services.96 The error log 
was erased when Peak technicians turned the MAl computers 
off because all data stored in RAM is lost when the computer is 
turned off. 97 
Peak argued that the representation of the 'operating 
software in RAM was not a copy because any representation in 
RAM is only temporary and not sufficiently permanent to be 
considered "fixed."98 However, based on the fact that the error 
log remained on the screen for a sufficient amount of time to 
allow Peak technicians to view it, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the loading of operating system software into RAM created 
a representation of the software that was "sufficiently perma-
nent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated for a period of more than transitory dura-
tion."99 As such, the court held that this representation was 
"fixed" and a "copy" within the meaning of § 101 of the Copy-
right Act. loO 
93. MAl, 991 F.2d at 517 (emphasis added). 
94. Id. at 518. A computer's random access memory is a component in which data 
and computer programs are temporarily stored when the computer is turned on and are 
erased when the computer is turned off. Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 
617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
95. MAl, 991 F.2d at 518. 
96. Id. The technicians used the error log only to the extent necessary to diagnose 
the problem. Id. 
97. Id. at 518. 
98.Id. 
99. Id. (emphasis added). 
100. Id. 
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In support of its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited Apple 
Computer v. Formula Internationa/,I°l which noted in dictum 
that a copy made in RAM is a temporary fixation. l02 Although 
the court recognized that Apple is not dispositive on this issue, 
it used Apple to support the conclusion that a copy made in 
RAM is "fixed" and hence a "copy" within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act. loS Furthermore, the court noted that although 
the question of whether the loading of software from the com-
puter's hard drive into RAM creates a "copy" is one of first im-
pression, courts have long recognized that the loading of 
software into the computer's hard drive creates a copy within 
the meaning of § 101 of the Copyright Act. l04 
After finding that the loading of software into RAM created 
a copy within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that, when Peak turned on MAl's computers, it in-
fringed on MAl's copyright in the operating system software. 1011 
MAl's software licenses allowed MAl customers to load software 
into RAM. loa These licenses did not allow third parties, such as 
Peak, to copy the software. l07 The court found that when Peak 
technicians turned on MAl computers, the operating system 
software was copied into RAM. lOS Therefore, the court reasoned 
that, in the absence of a valid license, Peak technicians could 
not turn on MAl computers without infringing MAl's copyright 
in its operating system software. loB 
101. 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
102. Apple, 594 F. Supp. 617 at 621-22. This case centered on the application of 17 
. U .S.C. § 117 to the permanent copying of software onto silicon chips. The district court 
held that § 117 did not apply because such copying was neither for archival purposes 
only nor an essential step in the utilization of the software, which could be used through 
RAM without making a permanent copy. The district court then pointed out that a copy 
made in RAM would only be a temporary fixation, as it will be lost after the computer is 
turned off. [d. 
103. MAl, 991 F.2d at 519. 
104. [d. (citing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 
1988); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08, at 8-105 (1983); and 
CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 13). The court admitted that it found these authorities 
"somewhat troubling since they do not specify that a copy is created regardless of 
whether the software is loaded into the RAM, the hard disk or the read only memory 
("ROM")." MAl, 991 F.2d at 519. 
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2. Software Licensees Are Not Eligible for Protection Under 
Section 117 of the Copyright Act 
In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit briefly noted that "[s]ince 
MAl licensed its software, the Peak customers do not qualify as 
"owners of copies" of the software and are thus not eligible for 
protection under § 117. "110 The court did not provide any fur-
ther clarification of this ruling. Neither did the court consider 
other possible justifications for the making of a copy in RAM, 
such as the Fair Use Doctrine.ll1 
v. CRITIQUE 
In MAl, the Ninth Circuit held that the loading of operat-
ing system software into a computer's RAM constitutes copy-
right infringement in the absence of a valid license. ll2 This hold-
ing is questionable on four grounds: First, the court is 
unpersuasive when citing support for its decision that the load-
ing of operating system software into RAM creates a copy for 
copyright purposes; second, the court dismisses § 117 as a possi-
ble justification for the copy; third, the court never considers the 
Doctrine of Fair Use as a possible justification for the copy; and 
finally, the impact of the court's decision on the third party 
maintenance market may bring the decision within the realm of 
an antitrust violation. Following is an analysis of each of these 
four areas of concern. 
A. LOADING OF OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE INTO RAM DOES 
NOT CREATE A COpy UNDER § 101 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
The Ninth Circuit held that the loading of operating system 
software into RAM creates a copy of a sufficiently fixed duration 
110. [d. at 519, n.5. 17 U.S.C. § 117, enacted by Congress in 1980, authorizes an 
"owner of a copy" of a computer program to make "another copy or adaptation" if it is 
"an essential step in the utilization of a computer program in conjunction with a ma-
chine," or for "archival purposes only." This section was implemented upon the recom-
mendation contained in the CONTU Final Report, which stated that "[blecause the 
placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a copy, the law should provide 
that persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be able to use them freely with-
out fear of exposure to copyright liability. CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 13. 
Ill. See MAl, 991 F.2d 51l. 
112. MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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to constitute a "copy" under § 101 of the Copyright Act.113 Al-
though recognizing that the case is not dispositive of the issue, 
the court cited Apple Computer114 to support its conclusion. I 1I1 
However, the Apple court found that the loading of a computer 
program into RAM is only a temporary fixationye The Apple 
court further noted that "the software [involved in the Apple 
case] could be used through RAM without making a permanent 
copy."ll'7 The language of the very authority the Ninth Circuit 
cited in support of its decision seems to support the proposition 
that a representation of the operating system in RAM is not suf-
ficiently permanent to qualify as a copy under the Copyright 
Act. lls 
B. EVEN IF LOADING OF OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE INTO 
RAM CONSTITUTES A COPY, IT SHOULD BE JUSTIFIED UNDER 
§ 117 OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
Even if loading of software into RAM can rightly be consid-
ered making a copy, § 117 of the Copyright Act provides, in per-
tinent part: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it 
is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of 
a computer program to make or authorize the 
making of another copy or adaptation of that 
computer program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is 
created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction 
with a machine and that it is used in no 
other manner .... 119 
113. [d. at 518. 
114. Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
115. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ninth 
Circuit's use of Apple in its analysis. 
116. Apple Computer, 594 F. Supp. at 621-22. 
117. ld. 
118. The MAl court did not distinguish Apple. Rather, it focused on the words 
"temporary fixation," with emphasis on "fixation," without discussing the impact of Ap-
ple's observations that software could be used through RAM without making a perma-
nent copy. MAl, 991 F.2d at 519. 
119. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980) (emphasis added). 
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Under this section, a third party maintenance provider such 
as Peak can make a copy of the operating system software pro-
vided that he is (1) the owner of a copy of the software and (2) is 
making the copy as an essential step in the utilization of the 
software. The following sections consider whether Peak's copy-
ing of the operating system software was an essential step in its 
utilization and whether the words "owner of a copy" should be 
construed to apply to "licensees of a copy." 
1. The Making of a Copy of Operating System Software by a 
Third Party Service Provider Is an Essential Step in the 
Customer's Utilization of the Computer 
Clearly, a customer cannot utilize a malfunctioning com-
puter. As a general rule, the computer maintenance technician 
cannot service the computer unless she turns it on.120 If a cus-
tomer wants his computer repaired, he must authorize the ser-
vice technician to turn the computer on. This, according to MAl, 
is the equivalent of authorizing the technician to make a tempo-
rary copy of the operating system software.121 Thus, authorizing 
a technician to make such a temporary copy of the software is 
an essential step in a customer's utilization of the computer.122 
2. Section 117 Should Apply to All Rightful Possessors of 
Software Copies 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the language "the owner of a 
copy" to mean that only owners of copies of software, as distin-
guished from licensees of copies of software, are entitled to the 
120. Katz & Bayha, supra note 11. 
121. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that operating system software is automati· 
cally loaded into RAM as soon as the computer is turned on. MAl, 991 F.2d at 518. The 
reason for such loading is that operating system software "is essential for anyone to pro-
ductively use the computer, because the operating system serves as the principal inter-
face between the computer itself, other applications software which might be used (such 
as word-processing software), and the user." Katz & Bayha, supra note 11. However, the 
Ninth Circuit held that loading of operating system software into RAM creates a suffi-
ciently fixed representation of the software to constitute a copy for copyright purposes. 
MAl, 991 F.2d at 518. 
122. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 11 ("An argument can be made that copies 
of computer software created by an independent service provider (ISO) on the user's 
behalf in the course of performing system diagnostic and repair services are an essential 
step in the user's use of the system and therefore permissible under § 117. "). 
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protection of § 117.123 Since MAl customers were licensees of 
the software, they could not authorize a third party to make any 
copies of the software, no matter how essential the purpose. 
When viewed in a vacuum, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of 
§ 117 is not surprising. After all, the language of § 117 refers to 
an "owner of a copy" and even leading commentators have 
reached the conclusion that this section does not apply to those 
who merely rent, lease, or otherwise possess the software without 
acquiring ownership of it.124 
However, when interpreting § 117, the Ninth Circuit did 
not view its provisions in a vacuum. The decision was set against 
the background of the computer maintenance market - a two 
to three billion dollar industry.125 When viewed in this context, 
the Ninth Circuit's strict interpretation of the language of § 117 
is inconsistent with the economic policy underlying the enact-
ment of this section. The economic policy is one of balancing the 
legitimate needs of computer users against the reasonable busi-
ness expectations of copyright owners.126 The MAl decision in-
terferes with the legitimate needs of computer users while re-
sulting in a windfall for software copyright owners.127 
a. Literal Interpretation of § 117 as Inapplicable to Licensees 
of Software Copies Virtually Ousts Third Party Mainte-
nance Providers from the Computer Maintenance Market 
One reason for the rapid growth of the computer mainte-
nance market is that most computer micro-hardware has become 
a commodity, making it less profitable to sell the hardware than 
to repair it. 128 As a result, there is a growing battle for the com-
123. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
124. See BOORSTYN, supra note 33, § 2.21, at 70-71; see also S.O.S. Inc. v. Payday, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding an owner of a copyright has certain 
rights under § 117 which a mere possessor does not). But see Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) and Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmil-
ler, 719 F. Supp. 1006 (D.Kan. 1989) (obliterating the owner-licensee distinction). 
125. Orenstein, supra note 11 (based on an estimate made by Ronald Katz, counsel 
to Independent Service Network International). 
126. CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 23-25. 
127. See infra notes 128-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of 
the MAl decision on computer users, third party maintenance providers, and software 
copyright owners. 
128. Orenstein, supra note 11 (based on a quote from David Hayes, head of the 
intellectual property department at the law firm of Fenwick & West). 
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puter maintenance market between manufacturers of computer 
micro-hardware and third-party service providers.129 MAl holds 
that an independent service provider cannot turn on a computer 
without infringing the copyright of the author of the operating 
software which that particular computer uses unless (1) she is 
the owner of the copyl30 of the operating softwarel31 or (2) she is 
licensed to make copies of that software. I.32 However, given the 
wide variety of computers on the market today, the cost of 
purchasing ownership of a copy of the operating system software 
for every type of computer that the independent provider ser-
vices is prohibitive. Even if the service provider were to limit 
itself to servicing only one or two different types of computers in 
order to bring the cost to a tolerable level, the service provider 
would not be able to purchase ownership of operating software 
copies. Software vendors usually structure software transfer 
transactions as licenses rather than outright sales in order to re-
tain greater control over the use of the software.133 
This leaves service providers with the licensing alternative. 
However, the road to obtaining licensing rights is also not an 
easy one for the service provider. Aside from the question of 
cost, there are licensing obstacles. Computer micro-hardware 
manufacturers often manufacture operating and other software 
for "their" computers.134 These manufacturers then copyright 
their software. 131! By requiring service providers to obtain a li-
cense prior to turning on a computer, MAl is requiring service 
providers to obtain a license from their competitors in the main-
tenance market. The difficulty the service provider faces in ob-
129. [d. 
130. "Owner of a copy of the software" is distinguished from the "owner of the 
software," i.e., the actual copyright holder. BOORSTYN, supra note 33, § 2.21, at 70-71. 
131. In which case she is protected under § 117. 
132. The Ninth Circuit used a series of steps to reach the conclusion that turning on 
of a computer may result in copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit first found that 
operating system software is automatically loaded into the computer's RAM when the 
computer is turned on. The court then found that because Peak technicians could per-
ceive (on the monitor screen) the representation of an error log made by the operating 
system software (after it was loaded into RAM), this representation constituted a copy 
under the Copyright Act. The court then found that this copy was not justified under 
§ 117 and concluded that the copy infringed the operating system software author's 
copyright. See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's 
analysis. 
133. Raysman & Brown, supra note 11; see also Orenstein, supra note 11. 
134. Orenstein, supra note 11. 
135. MAl was just such a manufacturer. 
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taining either ownership or licensing rights to copies of operat-
ing software puts control in the hands of manufacturers/ 
copyright owners, virtually ousting third-party providers from 
the computer maintenance market. 136 
b. CONTU Intended § 117 to Apply to All Rightful Possessors 
of Software Copies 
In view of the strong consequences of finding that copying 
operating system software into RAM is a copyright infringe-
ment, the existence of any possible justification for this copying 
should be considered by courts in determining whether a copy-
right has been violated. Following this reasoning, instead of dis-
missing § 117 as inapplicable to "non-owners" of computer 
software copies, it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at the 
legislative intent behind it. In determining the legislative intent 
of § 117, four considerations are pertinent: First, Congress en-
acted this section based on the recommendations made by 
CONTU;137 second, Congress adopted CONTU's language with 
only one changel38 and left no legislative history to explain the 
reason for the change;139 third, CONTU left a comprehensive 
record explaining the reasoning behind its choice of words;140 
and fourth, Congress acknowledged that CONTU was the 
authority "with respect to clarifying the law of copyright of 
136. Katz & Arnold, supra note 11 ("Because the vast majority of repairs cannot be 
accomplished without turning on the machine, if the Ninth Circuit is upheld, depending 
on the language in the license for the operating system software, ISOs [independent ser-
vice providers] may not be able to service high-tech equipment any longer."); see also 
Raysman & Brown, supra note 11 ("[A]ccess by an ISO to a system may ultimately 
depend on whether the user can be characterized as the "owner" of a copy of software, or 
merely as a 'licensee.' "); Orenstein, supra note 11 (quoting David Hayes, head of the 
intellectual property department at Fenwick & West: "[MAl] is a potentially huge deci-
sion for the third-party maintenance providers .... It gives the copyright owner the 
right to control who can exercise the program. That's a pretty powerful right."); Oren-
stein, supra note 11 (quoting Ron Ben-Yehuda, a senior associate at Blanc, Williams, 
Johnston & Kronstadt: "The extent of control by vendors is critical because of the 
growth in the computer market, and the MAl decision is 'definitely another weapon in 
the vendor's arsenal.' "). 
137. H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23. See supra note 41. 
138. Congress granted the limited right to copy and adapt software under § 117 to 
"owner[s] of a copy" of software as opposed to "rightful possessors" of a copy of 
software, as suggested by CONTU. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980). 
139. H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23.17 U.S.C. See supra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
140. CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 31; see also supra note 40. 
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computer software."I4I Together, these considerations have 
prompted courts to rely on the CONTU final report as the ex-
pression of Congressional intent behind § 117.142 . 
CONTU reasoned that rightful possessors of copyrighted 
software should be free to use the software in the manner in 
which they intend and justifiably expect to use it, without fear-
ing claims of copyright infringement.143 In other words, CONTU 
believed that purchasers of computer software should be given 
the benefit of their bargain. I44 At the time of CONTU's final rec-
ommendations and continuing today, the customary practice 
was for software owners to sell licensing rights to their software, 
rather than the software itselU41i Then and now, the overwhelm-
ing majority of purchasers of computer software were licensees 
141. HR REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23. See supra note 43. 
142. Sega, 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 n.5 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Congress adopted all of the 
statutory changes recommended by CONTU verbatim. Subsequent Congresses, the 
courts, and commentators have regarded the CONTU report as the authoritative guide 
to Congressional intent."). See also Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Congress wrote into the law the [CONTU] majority's 
recommendations almost verbatim."); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Soft. Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260-
61 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The absence of an extensive legislative history and the fact that 
Congress enacted proposed § 117 with only one change have prompted courts to rely on 
the CONTU report as an expression of the legislative intent."); John M. Conley & Vance 
F. Brown, Revisiting § 117 of the Copyright Act: An Economic Approach, THE COM-
PUTER LAWYER, November 1990 (stating "The courts have treated the CONTU report as 
the legislative history of the 1980 computer related amendments to §§ 101 and 117."). 
143. CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 13 ("Because the placement of a work into a 
computer is the preparation of a copy, the law should provide that persons in rightful 
possession of copies of programs be able to use them freely without fear of exposure to 
copyright liability."). See also CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 29-30 ("One who right-
fully possesses a copy of a program . . . should be provided with a legal right to copy 
[the software] to the extent which will permit its use by the possessor."). 
144. CONTU observed that situations could arise "in which the copyright owner 
might desire, for good reason, or none at all, to force a lawful owner or possessor of a 
copy to stop using a particular program." CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 13. "By thus 
denying to one who had lawfully acquired a copy of a program the right to make addi-
tional copies necessary to its use, the copyright holder could be in a position to deprive 
him of the benefit of the acquisition bargain." Conley & Brown, supra note 44; see also 
Katz & Bayha, supra note 11. 
145. [d. For example, most "over the counter" software, accessible to the average 
computer user in the average computer store, automatically comes with "shrinkwrap" 
licenses. Thus, when you go into a store and buy a word-processing program or other 
software, you are not acquiring ownership of that copy, merely a license to use it. Bigger 
systems require signed licensing agreements, such as the one used by MAL Orenstein, 
supra note 11. 
Most of these licenses prohibit the licensee from allowing a third-party to make a 
copy of the software for any reason whatsoever. For example, a typical MAl software 
license provides that: 
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rather than owners. CONTU must have been aware of this prac-
tice when providing that § 117 apply to all "rightful possessors" 
of a copy of software, rather than only to "owners of a copy." 
CONTU must have realized that to apply § 117 merely to own-
ers of a copy would deprive the vast majority of computer 
software purchasers, who are licensees, of the benefit of their 
bargain.146 
c. The Internal Inconsistency of § 117 is Another Indication 
that Congress Intended It to Apply to All Rightful 
Possessors 
Another argument in favor of interpreting § 117 as applying 
to all rightful possessors rather than just to owners of software 
copies is Congress' lack of parallelism in substituting "owners" 
for "rightful possessors." Subsection 2 of § 117 provides that all 
archival copies must be destroyed "in the event the continued 
possession of the computer program should cease to be right-
Licensee shall not give access nor shall it disclose the Diagnos-
tics (in any form) . . . to any person . . . without the written 
permission of [MAl). Licensee may authorize not more than 
three (3) of its bona fide employees to utilize the Diagnostics 
. . . if, and only if, they agree to be bound by the terms 
thereof. 
MAl, 991 F.2d at 517 n.3. 
146. See Katz & Bayha, supra note 11 ("If § 117 is not applicable to licensees, it 
will be rarely applicable to anyone possessing a copy of computer software (except in the 
case of more modern computerized devices, such as found in automobiles, where licens-
ing has not yet become prevalent)."). 
See also RA V Comm., Inc. v. Philipp Bros., 1 CCH Computer Cases P 46,048 at 
60,999 (S.D.N.Y., 1988). The factual pattern is somewhat similar to MAl. RAV licensed 
its communications programs to Philipp, supplied the hardware to run the programs, 
and provided maintenance and upgrade services. ld. at 61,000. Philipp lured a number of 
RA V employees to work for it and obtained the programs' source code from them. ld. 
Using this source code, Philipp altered, changed, and upgraded RA V's proprietary source 
codes to accommodate Philipp's internal use of the communication programs. ld. In de-
ciding that Philipp was not liable for copyright infringement, the court held that § 117 
"should be given a broader reading where the owner of a copy of a computer program 
adopts it for his own internal use." ld. at 61,001 (emphasis added). The court noted that 
the adaptation must be necessary to allow use of the program for the purpose for which 
it was purchased. ld. Conversely, § 117 should be given a broader reading where the 
copying of the program is necessary to allow the program's internal, intended use. Be-
cause a program cannot be utilized on a malfunctioning computer, a technician must be 
allowed to copy operating system software in order to service the computer and to allow 
the software purchaser to utilize her program. To hold otherwise would be to deny the 
software purchaser the benefit of her bargain. 
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ful."H7 The word "rightful" parallels CONTU's intent to compel 
a licensee acting under § 117 to destroy archival copies upon 
termination of her license. H8 However, the first paragraph of 
§ 117 refers only to owners of software copies, not to licen-
sees. l•9 This poses a curious question: "How can an owner cease 
to be a rightful possessor?"IIiO The lack of parallelism in the lan-
guage of § 117 suggests that Congress' change of CONTU's 
wording may have been hasty or inadvertent. llll After all, to in-
terpret § 117 as applying only to "owners" of software copies 
would be to render the section essentially meaningless. 1112 
The MAl decision to uphold the distinction between owners 
and licensees in the application of § 117 has been consistent 
with previous Ninth Circuit decisions. IllS However, three factors 
urge a change in the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 117. 
CONTU intended § 117 to apply to all rightful possessors. lM 
Congress' change of CONTU's language is neither explained nor 
uniform and may be inadvertent.lIiIi Finally, applying § 117 
solely to owners of copies of software renders the section essen-
tially meaningless and bears inequitable results. IllS 
147. 17 U .S.C. § 117(2) (1988) (emphasis added). 
148. Conley & Brown, supra note 44. 
149. 17 u.s.C. § 117 (1980). 
150. Conley & Brown, supra note 44. 
151. Id. 
If Congress had intended to limit the protection of § 117 to 
owners in the strict sense, it presumably also would have 
changed subsection 2 and the unnumbered final paragraph to 
make the straightforward point that an owner who transferred 
the underlying program would have the choice of transferring 
or destroying any archival copies he had made, but could not 
have it both ways by selling the original and keeping the cop-
ies. The present awkwardness suggests that the significant 
change in the preamble was made in haste, if not by 
inadvertence. 
Id.; see also Raysman & Brown, supra note 11 (recognizing that not all courts accept the 
distinction made in MAl between owners and licensees.); Katz & Bayha, supra note 11 
(suggesting § 117 should be liberally interpreted to apply to licensees as well as to own-
ers of software copies). 
152. Katz & Arnold, supra note 11. 
153. S.O.S., Inc. u. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990); Apple Computer 
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
154. CONTU Rep., supra note 38, at 29-30. 
155. See supra notes 43, 147-151 and accompanying text for a discussion of Con-
gress' substitution of "rightful possessors" of a copy with "owners of a copy." 
156. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the chilling effect 
of the MAl holding. 
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Of course, one may argue that instead of reading CONTU's 
intent into § 117, the courts should take a strict approach to the 
section and hope that the chilling result caused by this approach 
will prompt Congress to clarify its intent with respect to applica-
bility. However, while the courts are waiting for Congress to do 
so, their decisions could wreak havoc in the computer mainte-
nance and software markets. I1i7 Although inferring a legislative 
intent behind any piece of legislation which does not expressly 
specify it is always risky, the inequitable results born by a literal 
interpretation of § 117, sustaining the owner licensee distinc-
tion, urge drawing such an inference. Both methods will eventu-
ally cause Congress to clarify the legislation. However, if only for 
humanitarian reasons, the courts should choose the method that 
most quickly reaches equitable results. 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE ApPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF 
FAIR USE 
The Ninth Circuit did not consider whether the Doctrine of 
Fair Use is a possible justification for the making of a temporary 
copy in RAM.I1iS In view of the far-reaching effect of the MAl 
decision on the computer maintenance and software market and 
in light of the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Sega Enter-
prises Ltd. u. Accolade, Inc.,1"9 the court's omission is 
puzzling.160 
157. See Conley & Brown. supra note 44 (stating § 117 as presently construed may 
not adequately balance the legitimate interests of the software copyright owner and the 
consumer). 
158. The Doctrine of Fair Use. incorporated into § 107 of the Copyright Act. pro-
vides. in pertinent part: 
[Tlhe fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work . . . is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use. including 
whether the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes. 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work. 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work. and 
(4) the effect of the use on the potential market for. or the 
value of. the copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1980). 
159. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); see supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Sega. 
160. The Sega court avoided a rigid application of the Copyright Act by using the 
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In Sega, the Ninth Circuit considered whether intermediate 
copying in the process of reverse engineering was a fair use of 
the copyrighted software.161 Applying the Fair Use Doctrine, the 
court held that if reverse engineering is the only way to access 
the non-copyrightable elements of the software, and if there is a 
legitimate reason for accessing these elements, reverse engineer-
ing is a fair use of the copyrighted software, as a matter of 
law. 162 In examining the facts of the case, the court concluded 
that intermediate copying is a necessary step in the process of 
reverse engineering and that reverse engineering is the only way 
to gain access to a copyrighted program's noncopyrightable, 
functional aspects. 163 The court also found that Accolade's rea-
son for accessing the non-copyrightable elements of Sega's pro-
gramsl64 was legitimate and consistent with the purpose of the 
Copyright Act. 16 /1 
Similarly, the copying involved in MAl is an unavoidable 
consequence of turning on a computer; turning on a computer is 
usually the only way to begin maintenance work. 166 Performance 
of maintenance work is a legitimate reason to justify the copying 
involved in MAl because computer systems, like everything 
man-made and fallible, have a tendency to break down. When 
this happens, the owner ordinarily has two options: to call a 
third-party maintenance technician or to call a technician from 
the company which manufactured the computer. Unless the 
kind of copying involved in MAl is justified under the Copyright 
Act, third-party maintenance providers will be forced out of the 
maintenance market/67 leaving owners of malfunctioning com-
Doctrine of Fair Use, sometimes referred to as the "safety valve" of copyright law, to 
prevent Sega from exercising a monopoly over the creation of games designed to run on 
its Genesis game console. Katz & Bayha, supra note 11. 
161. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522-27. 
162. ld. at 1527 (emphasis added). 
163. ld. at 1522-1527. 
164. Accolade needed to access these non-copyrightable elements to achieve compat-
ibility with the Genesis console with which Sega games were already compatible. 
165. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1527. 
166. Katz & Bayha, supra note 11. 
167. The MAl holding forces third-party maintenance providers to purchase li-
censes to use the operating system software of the computers which they maintenance. 
Given the great variety of different operating system software, the cost of purchasing a 
license to use the operating system software of each computer serviced by a third-party 
provider is prohibitive. Neither does it make good business sense for a third-party pro-
vider to purchase licenses for only a few varieties of operating system software and then 
wait until the particular computers that use that software happen to malfunction. The 
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puters with only one option - calling the technician from the 
manufacturing company. The effect may lead to a monopoly, 
where a small number of manufacturing companies exercise con-
trol over a large computer maintenance market.16s In addition, 
limiting the maintenance market to which customers can turn 
will almost certainly raise the price of computer maintenance.169 
Furthermore, the inadvertent copying of operating system 
software in order to maintain a computer is justified under the 
purpose of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act presupposes 
that authors will have increased motivation to invest sufficient 
resources in producing and publishing original works if they are 
promised property rights that will enable them to profit from 
their work's dissemination.170 However, the Act most probably 
does not presuppose that these property rights should extend 
beyond the work's dissemination and into the maintenance mar-
ket servicing the work. The purpose of the Copyright Act is to 
promote creative expression, not to create perpetual profit. 171 
Applying the holding of Sega to the facts of MAl leads to 
the conclusion that the copying of operating system software 
into RAM is the only way of achieving the legitimate objective 
third'party provider's position is further complicated by the fact that most computer 
manufacturers are also manufacturers of those computers' operating system software as 
well as competitors in the computer maintenance market. Thus, the effect of the MAl 
holding is to require third party maintenance technicians to purchase licenses from their 
competitors. Together, these factors effectively exclude third-party maintenance provid-
ers from the maintenance market. See supra notes 128-136 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the effect of the MAl decision on the computer maintenance market. 
168. See Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAl Sys. Corp., 1993 WL 522850 1 (E.D. Va. 
1993) (plaintiffs' complaint alleges, inter alia, that purchasers of MAl operating system 
software have been and are being wrongfully forced to buy MAl's hardware service). See 
infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text for a discussion of a potential monopolizing 
effect of the MAl decision on the computer maintenance market. 
169. See Advanced Computer Servs., 1993 WL 522850 1 (plaintiffs' complaint al-
leges, inter alia, that prices for MAl hardware service have been and are higher than 
they would be in a competitive market and that the supply of such service has been and 
is lower than it would be in a competitive market). See infra note 174 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of a potential monopolizing effect of the MAl decision on the com-
puter maintenance market. 
170. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 30. 
171. The Copyright Act balances two competing claims: motivating creative work by 
providing a temporary monopoly to its authors while at the same time promoting broad 
public availability of the creative work. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 30. Nimmer takes this 
analysis one step further, stating that "the primary purpose of copyright is not to reward 
the author, but is rather to secure the general benefits derived by the public' from the 
labors of the authors." NIMMER, supra note 31, § 1.03 at 1-44.13, 1-44.14. 
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of allowing third-party maintenance technicians to service the 
computer, and should be a fair use of the operating system 
software as a matter of law. 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION MAY CONFLICT WITH THE 
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
The Ninth Circuit's decision that the loading of operating 
system software into a computer's RAM constitutes copyright 
infringement may result in a virtual ousting of third party main-
tenance providers from the computer maintenance market.172 
This result is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's 
concern for the necessity of competition in the service market 
between third party maintenance providers and manufactur-
ers.173 In the absence of any discussion of policy considerations 
by the Ninth Circuit, it is difficult to reconcile the MAl decision 
with Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.174 
172. See supra notes 128-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of 
the MAl decision on the computer maintenance market; see also Katz & Arnold, supra 
note 11. 
173. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 n.6 (1992). 
174. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890). See Raysman & Brown, supra note 118; see also Ad-
vanced Computer Servs, 1993 WL 522850 1 (E.n. Va. 1993). Advanced Computer Servs 
arose because MAl, citing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in MAl, sent cease and desist letters 
to independent service providers servicing MAl systems. Seven of these independent ser-
vice providers served a joint suit against MAl, seeking injunctive relief. Plaintiffs-service 
providers alleged that MAl practiced (1) per se tying, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman 
Act; (2) rule of reason tying, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act; and (3) monopoliza-
tion, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. ld. Plaintiffs' argument is as follows: 
MAl computers are unique. . . . Because special training is re-
quired to maintain MAl systems, purchasers of MAl com-
puters have limited choices in selecting a ·maintenance and 
service firm; they must select either MAl or another firm, in-
cluding any of plaintiffs, that specializes in the servicing and 
maintenance of MAl computers .... MAl ... developed [and 
copyrighted) unique operating system software designed to 
provide the basic commands to operate MAl computers. . . . 
MAl licenses, but does not sell, this software .... [Citing 
MAl). MAl's view [is) that any use of the software by plain-
tiffs, who are unlicensed, including simply "loading" or "boot-
ing" the {operating system} software by turning the computer 
on, constitutes unauthorized use prohibited by law .... Plain-
tiff further alleges that MAl is exploiting the complete market 
power it enjoys over the sale of its copyrighted software to dis-
tort and preclude competition in the . . . market for mainte-
nance and repair services for MAl computers. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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D. PEAK'S UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT MAY HAVE COMPELLED 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT TO COME TO A RASH DECISION 
Peak is not a particularly sympathetic entity. It lured away 
MAl's customer service manager, as well as three other MAl em-
ployees; it stole MAl's customers; and it allegedly ran MAl oper-
ating system software on several computers at its headquarters, 
despite being licensed to use the software to operate only one 
system. l75 In the words of MAl counsel William Robinson, 
"[Peak] hired our employees, went after our customers and used 
our diagnostics to make a heck of a lot of money."176 
Although a case may be a world unto itself to the parties 
involved, it should be analyzed with reference to its place in the 
development of our law and society. In its desire to punish 
Peak's misdeeds, the Ninth Circuit may have reached a decision 
before examining its long-term consequences. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Sherman Act) provides: 
Section 1 
Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Restraint 
of Trade: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or oth-
erwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall 
make any contract or engage in any combination or con-
spiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court. 
Section 2 
Monopolization, Attempted Monopolization, and Con-
spiracies to Monopolize: 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to mo-
nopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person 
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, 
shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a 
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by im-
prisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of the court. 
175. MAl, 991 F.2d at 519. 
176. Orenstein, supra note 11. 
33
Levin: Intellectual Property Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
682 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:649 
These consequences are incongruous. On the one hand, the 
decision threatens the very existence of third-party maintenance 
providersl77 and hovers on the edge of an antitrust violation.178 
On the other hand, although the decision prohibits software 
licensees to authorize a third-party to make a copy of the 
software under any circumstances not specifically authorized 
under the license, a licensee might circumvent this problem 
merely by turning the computer on herself.179 What cannot be 
accomplished by the technician alone might easily be accom-
plished merely by taking a second of the customer's time. If the 
MAl decision is really so easy to bypass, it will. cause no harm to 
the computer maintenance market, aside from some inconve-
nience. Otherwise, the decision will have a serious impact on the 
computer maintenance and software community. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The MAl decision has resulted in incongruous consequences 
that have puzzled and confused both the legal community and 
third-party maintenance providers. ISO The court has afforded us 
few explanations and conflicting authority as to why the loading 
of operating system software into RAM creates a copy under the 
Copyright Act. Neither has the court provided us with policy ex-
planations as to why the Doctrine of Fair Use was not consid-
ered and § 117 was dismissed in a footnote. The court does not 
seem to recognize the potential monopolizing impact of its deci-
sion on the third party computer maintenance market. Perhaps 
the loathsome nature of Peak's unprofessional conduct com-
pelled the court to take swift action prior to analyzing the full 
impact of its decision. Although the court has not disclosed its 
motivation behind the MAl decision, this decision is in stark 
contrast to the Ninth Circuit's earlier decisions in the computer 
177. See supra note 136 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of the 
MAl decision on third-party maintenance providers. 
178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text for a brief discussion applying the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. 
179. See Katz & Arnold, supra note 11 (asking whether a court would enjoin an 
owner from turning on its own computer for the purpose of an ISO maintaining it, just 
because such an act would be in concert with an ISO that was enjoined from turning on 
the machine?). 
180. Davidson, supra note 11 (MAl v. Peak deserves special mention because it is 
the first reported decision to hold that the mere turning on of a computer -for a purpose 
not authorized by the operating system license is an act of copyright infringement). 
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software field lSI and with the purpose behind the Copyright 
Act.IS2 
Katrine Levin* 
181. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Lewis Galoob 
Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). 
182. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523 (holding that the Copyright Act must be considered in 
light of its basic purpose of stimulating artistic creativity for the general public good). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995. 
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